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P ROTEAN J US A D B ELLUM
Sean D. Murphy*
I.

INTRODUCTION
On the 100th anniversary of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, it is entirely appropriate to

look back at the accomplishments of that event, and at the strides that have been made over the past
century for developing international law and institutions. Perhaps more important, however, is to
consider the direction international law will take during the next 100 years—to ask about the legacy
that will be discussed at the 200th anniversary of the Hague Conference. The purpose of this essay
is to consider the past, present and, especially, future state of the jus ad bellum, the set of rules in
international law designed to regulate the resort to war by states. Will the jus ad bellum in 2107 look
the same as it does today or, as was the case for the past 100 years, might we anticipate efforts to
progressively develop it in some fashion?
The jus ad bellum is generally viewed as a static field of law. The standard account is that
when the UN Charter was adopted in 1945, it enshrined a complete prohibition on the use of force
in inter-state relations, except when action is being taken in self-defense against an armed attack or
under authorization of the UN Security Council. No other exceptions to the general prohibition are
permitted, whether for purposes of rescuing ones nationals abroad, saving aliens from widespread
deprivation of human rights, acting preemptively against a grave but distant threat, or for any other
reason.
_________________________________________
* Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington University. This essay
benefitted from comments by Vijay Padmanabhan and by participants at both the WaltherSchücking-Instituts für Internationales Recht November 2007 conference in Kiel, Germany, and the
Temple Law School March 2008 International Law Colloquium in Philadelphia. My thanks to Kelly
Dunn for research assistance.
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To the extent that some states or commentators see value in further exceptions, the approach
is generally still to view the jus ad bellum as static, but to engage in contorted interpretations of the
Charter’s text so as to allow further exceptions, or to admit that no exceptions exist but to argue that
deviation is legitimate in extreme circumstances even if not lawful. Of course some observers, whose
views are largely grounded in realism theories of international relations, simply conclude that the jus
ad bellum is a utopian notion that has no real relevance for contemporary inter-state behavior.
Yet it seems likely that in the years to come, many states and non-state actors will
increasingly insist upon a different vision of the jus ad bellum, one that conceives of it as more
protean in nature. Protean jus ad bellum acknowledges that, as of 1945, the static view was correct,
but that over time—as we approach the 70th anniversary of the United Nations—the jus ad bellum
is changing, buffeted in particular by several significant developments: (1) the emergence of
weapons of mass destruction of various types potentially controllable by states and non-state actors;
(2) the rise of global terrorism as a mechanism for projecting violence against states by non-state
actors; (3) the elevation of the person to a central place in the realm of international law, both in
terms of being protected and in terms of being accountable for misconduct; (4) the inability of the
Security Council to be accepted by all states as a disinterested arbiter willing and capable of acting
to address all threats to international peace and security as they arise; and (5) the continuing erosion
of the sanctity of the sovereign state, resulting from exposure to myriad effects of globalization,
including intrusive transnational rule of law programs, election monitoring, incessant and extensive
media coverage, powerful transnational corporations and non-governmental organization, and
relatively unrestricted transborder movement of capital, goods, and persons across borders.
Further, protean jus ad bellum refers to a normative regime that is less oriented toward a
textual codification of the norm and more toward its practical and nuanced application in a complex
and changing global environment. As such, protean jus ad bellum resists a binary approach of
regarding all uses of force of a particular type (e.g., humanitarian intervention) as being
lawful/unlawful in all situations, and favors instead an approach that calibrates a range of factors that
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are important in predicting the likely response of the global community to a coercive act. Certain
forms of state practice, such as the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia in support of Kosovar Albanians,
will lend credence to the vision of protean jus ad bellum, even as other state practice continues to
support the static view.
This essay suggests that the failure to either formally accept or reject the idea of protean jus
ad bellum is likely, over time, to diminish the jus ad bellum’s effectiveness as a normative regime.
Already, there exists considerable confusion or disagreement about the contemporary parameters of
the jus ad bellum; if you were to ask a random group of legal advisers to foreign ministries their
views on whether, for example, humanitarian intervention, or using force to rescue nationals abroad,
or a cross-border raid against a terrorist camp, are permissible under the jus ad bellum, you are likely
to receive a mixture of answers: some saying yes; some saying no; some insisting that it depends on
the circumstances; and some refusing to respond to the question. Too often transnational uses of
military force are occurring in circumstances that are inconsistent with the idea of a static jus ad
bellum: states and non-state actors are, at least in some situations, tolerating certain types of force
in response to the overarching developments noted above. As the International Criminal Court
moves closer to including aggression within its mandate for indicting and prosecuting persons,
government leaders may see greater value in clarifying what uses of force are permissible.
Things could continue as they are. But in the long-term, if the jus ad bellum is not to break
down, then a more formal way should be found either to reject the notion of protean jus ad bellum
or to accept it, and if the latter, then to try to identify the contemporary rules in this area, either
through formal amendment of the UN Charter, through authoritative interpretations by the principal
organs of the United Nations or regional organizations, or through other means.
II.

STATIC JUS AD BELLUM
In many areas of international law, the law accommodates the possibility of change. Under

the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, for example, practice of the parties subsequent to the
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entry into force of treaty is a salient factor for interpreting and reinterpreting the meaning of the
treaty. 1 Even if the treaty meant X1 at the time it was adopted, practice by the states thereafter may
change the norm to mean X2. In the context of a treaty establishing an international organization,
such practice may include precedents set by institutional practice of the organization itself;
moreover, greater license is typically granted for teleological interpretations of such treaties in
recognition of the need for the international organization to evolve over time.2
Customary international law, of course, is also built upon the idea that contemporary state
practice, in conjunction with opinio juris, serves to establish the law, even if that law was different
at some earlier time. General principles of law, the third main source of international law, can also
change to the extent that principles of law operating in legal systems worldwide change over time.
International judicial decisions, though in theory limited to the parties in the case before the tribunal,
are widely regarded as assisting in the development and evolution of international law over time.3
The jus ad bellum, however, is viewed by most states and scholars as a static norm. Under
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, a state may not use force against another state.4 Under Article 51, a
state may respond in self-defense to an “armed attack.”5 Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UN
Security Council, in response to a threat to the peace, may authorize states to take forcible measures.6

1

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT).
2

See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, Interpreting the Law, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 18687 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995).
3

See, e.g., Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 15 (Mar. 3) (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez) (asserting that
ICJ decisions “create precedents” and dynamically change international law).
4

Charter of the United Nations, art. 2(4), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.

5

Id., art. 51.

6

Id., arts. 41 & 42.

5
Put all together, static jus ad bellum maintains that a state may not use armed force against another
state unless it is defending against an armed attack or is authorized by the Security Council to do so.
Though it has been more than sixty years since enactment of the Charter, and though there
is considerable state practice involving uses of coercion in circumstances that do not fit the basic
paradigm, no consensus exists that the paradigm has changed in any significant way. No doubt there
are several reasons why this particular norm has continued to be viewed as static. First, as a formal
matter, since the norm is enshrined in the Charter, and since the Charter has a superior status within
the hierarchy of international law,7 there is a reluctance to see the norm change absent a formal
alteration, such as through amendment of the Charter. This is not to say that the Charter can only
change through formal amendment; plenty of examples exist of changes to the Charter through
consensus interpretation of the UN member states. Yet such change is not common and does require
a high threshold of consensus. Second, the jus ad bellum is considered a fundamental element in
international law, so much so that most view it as a norm of jus cogens that cannot be altered by
states even through treaty relations.8 While alterations of other norms may have significant social
or economic effects (e.g., establishing and expanding an exclusive economic zone outside the
territorial sea), the stakes in altering the jus ad bellum are viewed as considerably higher, and as
potentially unleashing a wide range of undesirable coercive behavior. Third, by its nature, the field
of jus ad bellum does not have extensive and repeated state practice that allows for definitive
evolution of the norm; rather, incidents are sparse, can often be distinguished through reference to
unique factual scenarios, and often elicit conflicting interpretations by states and scholars concerning

7
8

Id., art. 103.

The VCLT defines jus cogens as a norm “accepted and recognised by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”
VCLT, supra note 1, art. 53. The ICJ has referred to the prohibition on the use of force by one
state against another as “a conspicuous example” of jus cogens, Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100, para. 190 (June 27).
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the significance of the incident for the law.9
The principal actors that might formally recognize a change in the norm for the most part
have no incentive to do so. Senior government officials in most states have a vested interest in
preserving to the extent possible a norm that prevents transnational uses of force, as a means of
fortifying their own authority with respect to external threats. Indeed, states without the power to
project force across boundaries appear to fear that formal changes in the jus ad bellum would be
simply a subterfuge for potential interventionist policies of the major powers. By contrast, the more
powerful states (e.g., the United States or United Kingdom) seem to favor the ability to use coercive
force in ways that deviate from the static jus ad bellum paradigm, since they tend not to feel
threatened by a change. Yet even those states may prefer to try to pigeon-hole their conduct into the
static jus ad bellum paradigm, rather than create a new precedent that might someday work to their
disadvantage. Meanwhile, groups that might be best served through a change in the paradigm, such
as persons facing human rights crises brought on or tolerated by their government, have little formal
voice in the state-centric system about whether and how the paradigm should change. For all these
reasons, the jus ad bellum as it was conceived in 1945 remains the dominant paradigm, at least
formally, today.
III.

PROTEAN JUS AD BELLUM
While there is no formal consensus that the jus ad bellum has changed from the time it was

enshrined in the UN Charter, there is considerable reason to think that is not a static norm, and that
informal expectations by states and other actors about it have evolved over time and will continue
to evolve in the future. Though in the aftermath of the two world wars, consensus crystalized on a
broad-scale prohibition on the use of armed force, other overarching developments since 1945—the
development of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of human rights law, and the emergence of
global terrorism as a mechanism for projecting violence against states by non-state actors—have
9

(2005).

See Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV . 699
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significantly affected attitudes toward permissible uses of force. In the face of these challenges, a
credible case can be made that the jus ad bellum has not remained static, but has changed and is
changing, or assumes different meanings when faced with different situations.
A.

The Pre-Charter Era

A starting point for viewing the jus ad bellum as protean in nature is to take the long view
and recognize that the static position is of relatively recent vintage, itself a product of change. The
Hague Peace Conference of 1907, in conjunction with its 1899 predecessor, ushered in a remarkable
century for the growth of public international law.10 Part of that growth entailed the emergence of
a highly restrictive jus ad bellum that did not previously exist; indeed, at the start of the twentieth
century, there was no globally-accepted norm prohibiting the resort to war. The conventions adopted
at the two peace conferences, however, began the process of limiting the means by which states
could resort to warfare. Thus, the 1907 Hague Convention II prohibited the resort to war completely
when the objective was the recovery of debt, unless the debtor State refused or neglected to resolve
the matter through arbitration.11 The Hague Convention III required states not to commence
hostilities without previous and explicit warning.12
That military force should be resorted to only for good reasons or just cause was, of course,
a sentiment that preceded the Hague Peace Conferences, harkening back to the just war doctrine of

10

The principal concern of Russian Tsar Nicholas II in convening the Hague Peace
Conferences lay in a desire to limit the number of armaments possessed by the major powers of
the world and hence to secure a durable peace, an effort that ultimately was not successful. See
generally CALVIN D. DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE
(1962).
11

1907 Hague Convention II Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for
the Recovery of Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241.
12

18, 1907.

1907 Hague Convention III Relative to the Commencement of Hostilities, art. 1, o9ct.
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Augustine and Aquinas,13 and even further back to the bellum justum et pium doctrine of early
Roman law.14 Yet in Hague Convention II is found the first effort at a conventional prohibition on
resort to war in a particular circumstance, where the purpose—economic redress—was considered
the least compelling for unleashing the dogs of war. By 1928, some states were willing to take the
considerably more extensive step of adhering to an instrument, the Kellogg-Briand Pact (or Pact of
Paris), by which they “condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,
and renounce[d] it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.”15
B.

Direct Aggression by States

The Kellogg-Briand Pact failed to stem the outbreak of World War II, but it set the stage for
the codification of Article 2(4) the UN Charter, the center-piece around which the static jus ad
bellum is now built. Though often debated, questioned, interpreted, and reinterpreted, Article 2(4),
in conjunction with Article 51, has established a quite stable and clear core normative proscription:
States are prohibited from using force against other states unless they are acting in self-defense or
under Security Council authorization. Though overt military attacks by one state against another
continue to this day, they are readily condemned by the global community and they often, though not
invariably, elicit significant counter-measures against the aggressor state. Efforts by one state to
annex another are almost unheard of—Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait being the exception that proves the
rule—leaving instead projections of force designed to temporarily punish a state, diminish its
military capacity, or perhaps adjust a bilateral boundary. Hence, at its heart, the jus ad bellum now
provides a formidable normative structure unheard of even 100 years ago.

13

AUGUST INE OF HIPPO, DE CIVITATE DEI (THE CITY OF GOD ) bk. 19, at 7 (1958);
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA ch. II-II, quae. 40, art. 1, reprinted in ST . THOMAS
AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 64-65 (P. Sigmund ed.) ( trans., 1988).
14

See 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE , COMM ENTA RIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-18 (3d ed.
1879); ARTHUR NUSSBAUM , A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 10-11 (rev. ed. 1954).
15

1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343.
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Even so, from the start, uncertainty existed about the scope and content of this basic
paradigm. Given that Article 2(4) only refers to “force,” is the prohibition limited to use of armed
force or does it proscribe other forms of coercion as well? What exactly is meant by prohibiting
“threats” to use force?16 If a state’s nationals are seized abroad by another state and held hostage, is
that a “use of force” within the meaning of Article 2(4)? If a state responds to such action by using
military force to rescue its nationals, is that self-defense against an “armed attack” within the
meaning of Article 51? Various examples of “rescue of nationals” exist in state practice, but the
concept does not sit easily within the terms of the Charter and hence has been controversial.17 In
short, even within the core Article 2(4)/Article 51 paradigm, difficult questions have arisen,
prompting extensive commentary over the years.18
C.

Indirect Aggression by States

Uses of force during the Cold War became much more complex than the type of aggression
that spawned World War II. Though direct armed conflict between states remained an important
concern, other forms of coercion came to pose a more difficult challenge to the jus ad bellum.
During the Cold War, the problem of indirect aggression forcefully emerged, whereby one state
surreptitiously supplied military and economic support to mercenaries, rebels or insurgents against
another state. If one were giving a talk in the 1960's about “new threats” in the jus ad bellum, indirect
aggression by states would have been the focal point of the discussion. And because of that, it
16

See generally NIKOLAS STÜRCHLER, THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2007); Marco Roscini, Threats of Armed Force and Contemporary International Law, 54 NETH.
INT ’L L. REV . 229 (2007).
17

See, e.g., LILLICH ON THE FORCIBLE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS ABROAD (Thomas C.
Wingfield & James E. Meyen eds., 2002) (volume 77 of the U.S. Naval War College Studies
series); NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION
AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY (1985).
18

See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE , INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
(1963); THOMAS M. FRANCK , RECOURSE TO FORCE : STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND
ARMED ATTACKS (2002); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2d
ed. 2004).
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became important to again revisit what exactly was meant by Article 2(4) and Article 51, in order
to elaborate upon what was left unsaid.
One important mechanism for illuminating the meaning of the jus ad bellum was through its
interpretation, in the context of specific incidents of state practice, by the principal organs of the
United Nations—the Security Council and the General Assembly. 19 Throughout the initial decades
of the Charter, those organs adopted various resolutions considering the projection of coercion in
various contexts, especially in the Middle East and Southern Africa.20 In some instances, the practice
even concerned attacks by a non-state actor against a state, such as the Security Council’s
condemnation as “aggression” of the 1977 attack by an invading force of mercenaries on the
Marxist-led government in Benin.21
Another important mechanism were interpretations by UN organs in a more generalized
fashion. In 1974 the General Assembly adopted its resolution on the Definition of Aggression,22
which served to provide a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of coercion that would violate Article
2(4). The standard paradigm of one state invading or bombarding another state was included, of
course, but so were other types of coercion that might have been seen as falling outside the scope
of Article 2(4), such as the blockading of ports. The Definition of Aggression recognized that
coercion violating Article 2(4) could arise from transboundary conduct of non-state actors—“armed
bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, at least when such actors were sent “by or on behalf of a
State” and when the coercion was “of such gravity” as to amount the kinds of coercion prohibited

19

The path breaking study on this phenomenon remains ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (1963).
20

See generally UNITED NATIONS, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT S RELATING TO
AGGRESSION 225-51 (2003).
21

S.C. Res. 405 (Apr. 14, 1977).

22

G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
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to states.23
The 1986 judgment by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case24 served as
something of a lightening rod for consideration of the meaning of direct and indirect aggression in
the Cold War era. The Court had not previously opined on the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51,
though it had addressed some issues relating to the use force in the course of deciding the Corfu
Channel case.25 The reasoning of the Court in Nicaragua was initially somewhat clouded by the
highly charged politics of the case, as well as the U.S. refusal to participate in the merits phase, but
over time the Court’s judgment seems to have passed into the corpus of accepted jurisprudence, to
the point where the United States itself now cites to the judgment as authority.
The basic paradigm set forth by the Nicaragua case found that certain acts, such as the
mining of another state’s harbors and attacks on another state’s naval vessels and oil facilities, were
violations of Article 2(4), a not particularly surprising outcome. More interesting was the Court’s
conclusion that certain acts in violation of Article 2(4) might not rise to the threshold of being an
“armed attack” for purposes of Article 51, and therefore could not be responded to through the
exercise of self-defense. This lack of symmetry between Articles 2(4) and 51 is well-grounded
textually in the Charter, but it also rather unsatisfactorily invites coercive behavior that operates
below the radar of “armed attack,” and hence has been criticized.
Another notable feature of the Court’s decision was its recognition that an armed attack
might occur through the conduct of non-state actors operating across a border. In that regard, the
Court confirmed that attribution of such conduct to a State was important in triggering a right of selfdefense against that State. Since the Court was not persuaded that the assistance to the Salvadorian

23

Id., art. 3(g).

24

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
25

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
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armed opposition was imputable to Nicaragua, nor that it was on a “scale of any significance,” the
United States had no right to embark on collective self-defense on behalf of El Salvador against
Nicaragua.
D.

Distant But Grave Threats

The Cold War also saw uncertainty about the temporal scope of the right of self-defense
under the Charter. Some maintained that a state could only respond in self-defense after having
suffered an armed attack from another state. The text of Article 51 supports that position, since it
acknowledges a right of self-defense only “if an armed attack occurs” against a UN Member.26
Yet the complex ways in which contemporary armed coercion can occur, and the dire
consequences of a delayed response to that coercion, have prompted observers to advance various
arguments for why self-defense may be undertaken even prior to an armed attack. One approach is
to emphasize a right of anticipatory or interceptive self-defense, by which is meant acting in selfdefense when there is convincing evidence that an armed attack is occurring even though the attacker
has not yet penetrated the defending state’s frontier.27 Thus, while it was Israel who first opened fire
in the 1967 Six Days War, it has been argued that Israel was responding to an “incipient armed attack
by Egypt (joined by Jordan and Syria),” as evidenced by Egypt’s “peremptory ejection of the United
Nations Emergency Force from the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula; the closure of the Straits of
Tiran; the unprecedented build-up of Egyptian forces along Israel’s borders; and constant sabre-

26

IAN BROWNLIE , INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 278 (1963)
(“the view that Article 51 does not permit anticipatory action is correct and . . . arguments to the
contrary are either unconvincing or based on inconclusive pieces of evidence.”); IAN BROWNLIE ,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 702 (6th ed. 2003) (“Since 1945 the practice of
States generally has been opposed to anticipatory self-defence.”).
27

See, e.g., QUINCY WRIGHT , THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION OF
WAR 60 (1961) (“it is not unreasonable to assume that an ‘armed attack’ is intended to include an
immediate threat of armed attack, thus justifying military counteraction in individual or
collective self-defence before there is an actual armed attack.”).
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rattling statements about the impending fighting.”28 Those in favor of allowing such anticipatory or
interceptive self-defense sought to extend the concept of an external armed attack to the earliest
stages of its unfolding (e.g., an “armed attack” begins as soon as your opponent commences warming
up its missile silos or directing its battle carrier group toward your coast) or sought to downplay the
express text of Article 51 as illustrating but not limiting the manner of self-defense. As a last resort,
some observers have stated that such anticipatory action was unlawful, but “may be justified on
moral and political grounds,” such that “the community will eventually condone [it] or mete out
lenient condemnation.”29
Some state practice supported this position but, as in most areas of the jus ad bellum, the
practice was too infrequent and too contested to lead to a consensus position. In 2005, a high-level
panel of experts convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report endorsing the
concept of a limited right of unilateral preemptive action when “the threatened attack is imminent,
no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate.”30
Still others have insisted that for especially grave threats, such as the development of a
nuclear or other mass destruction weapon by an unpredictable state, it was also permissible to resort
to armed force months or even years in advance to prevent the threat from occurring.31 Sporadic
practice lent some credence to this concept of preemptive or preventive self-defense, such as the
1962 U.S.-led “quarantine” of Cuba in response to the planned deployment of long-range missiles

28

YORAM DINSTEIN , WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 172-73 (3d ed. 2001).

29

ANTONIO CASSESE , INTERNATIONAL LAW 361-62 (2d ed. 2005).

30

UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, para.
188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter “High-level Panel Report”].
31

For a recent proposal, with a preference for authorization by the United Nations or a
regional organization, but allowing residually for unilateral action, see Lee Feinstein & AnneMarie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 136, 137 (Jan./Feb. 2004) (“Like the
responsibility to protect, the duty to prevent begins from the premise that the rules now
governing the use of force, devised in 1945 and embedded in the UN Charter, are inadequate.”).
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or the 1986 U.S. bombing raids against Libya purportedly to stem future Libyan terrorism. Yet,
again, the practice was too uneven to demonstrate widespread acceptance. Indeed, in some instances,
such as the 1981 Israeli attack against a nascent Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak, the condemnation
of the action by the UN General Assembly as “aggression”32 and by the Security Council as a
violation of the UN Charter33 strongly suggested that such action was prohibited.
Most recently, this concept of preemptive or preventive self-defense was endorsed by the
Bush Administration in its statements on the U.S. national security strategy, which identified an
evolving right under international law for the United States to use military force preemptively against
the threat posed by “rogue states” possessing WMDs.34 The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, though
technically undertaken based on a legal theory of Security Council authorization,35 has widely been
interpreted as an application of the doctrine of preemptive or preventive self-defense. The 2005 U.N.
high-level panel did not adopt this concept, finding that if there are “good arguments for preventive
military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council,
which can authorize such action if it chooses to.”36
E.

Grave Threats to Persons

One of the signature developments of international law in the twentieth century was the rise

32

G.A. Res. 36/27 (Nov. 13, 1981).

33

S.C. Res. 487 (June 19, 1981).

34

WHITE HOUSE , THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 15 (Sept. 17, 2002) (“For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that
present an imminent danger of attack. . . . We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”).
35

See Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO . L.J. 173, 174-76

36

UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel Report, supra note 30, at para. 190.

(2004).
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of human rights; the recognition that central to the project of the rule of law in inter-state affairs is
the protection of persons from the excesses of their own governments. At the time the Charter was
adopted, the concept of human rights was known, but was radically under-developed. Through the
establishment of a series of multilateral treaties and associated institutions, human rights has
emerged as a powerful normative regime for identifying protections that states owe to their nationals
and for promoting the global monitoring of those rights. Moreover, the field of human rights has
helped open the door for imposition of criminal responsibility on those persons who unleash human
rights violations and in some situations illuminated connections between rights-abuse and threats
to international peace.
The interface of human rights protections and the use of force prohibition has been troubled,
especially since the end of the Cold War. The static jus ad bellum paradigm on its face provides no
opening for the transnational use of force to protect the rights of persons within the targeted state
absent Security Council authorization. Textual arguments have been deployed in favor of regarding
humanitarian intervention as consistent with Article 2(4) since it is not the kind of force proscribed
by that article37 or as consistent with Article 51 since “self-defense” necessarily embraces the notion
of defense of others,38 while arguments more rooted in moral philosophy or natural law call for
interpreting ambiguous rules in favor a just outcome, thus permitting use of force when necessary
to save lives.39
Arguable examples of intervention undertaken to prevent human rights crises occurred during
the Cold War, such as the interventions of India in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam in Cambodia in
1978, or Tanzania in Uganda to oust Idi Amin. After the Cold War, humanitarian crises in the 1990's,
37
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especially in Rwanda, continued to provoke a robust debate over the legality of humanitarian
intervention.40 Perhaps the high point to date was the March/April 1999 NATO bombing campaign
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia), undertaken to prevent its government from
engaging in ethnic cleansing and atrocities in the autonomous province of Kosovo, which in 2008
has become an independent state.
Shortly after the Kosovo incident, an International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) (established by the Government of Canada) issued a December 2001 report
entitled The Responsibility to Protect, which sought to provide a legal and ethical foundation for
humanitarian intervention.41 The report asserted that a responsibility to protect (or “R2P”)42 exists
under international law. Further, the report stated that in circumstances when the Security Council
fails to discharge that responsibility, “in a conscience-shocking situation crying out for action,” then
it “is a real question in these circumstances where lies the most harm: in the damage to international
order if the Security Council is bypassed or in the damage to that order if human beings are
slaughtered while the Security Council stands by.”43 By contrast, the 2005 U.N. high-level panel,
writing in the wake of the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, agreed with the ICISS that there existed
an “emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect,” but concluded
that armed force may be used to fulfil the responsibility only if so authorized by the Security
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Council.44 Further, the high-level panel identified five criteria of “legitimacy” when engaging in such
intervention, relating to the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the intervenors, the
exhaustion of other means, proportionality, and a balancing of the ensuing consequences.45 The U.N.
Secretary-General thereafter generally endorsed the high-level panel’s approach46 as did the General
Assembly in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document,47 though neither expressly adopted the five
criteria nor expressly ruled out the unilateral use of force.48
While the ICISS drew the line for humanitarian intervention at “conscience-shocking
situations crying out for action,” others have argued in favor of using force to protect a broader array
of human rights. Thus, rather than limit the use of force only to extreme situations, such as to prevent
genocide or crimes against humanity, some favor deployment of armed force to restore a democratic
government to power (as arguably occurred with the U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983). No doubt
with an eye on these emerging threats, the Nicaragua Court issued statements casting doubt on the
ability of states to use force to protect human rights49 or to bring about regime change,50 although
those statements are probably best construed in the context of the facts presented and the positions
pled (or not pled) in that case.
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F.

Grave Threats from Transnational Terrorism

If one were to identify the “new threats” faced at the beginning of the 21st century, many
observers would likely point to the problem of potential projection of force on a massive scale by
non-state actors, operating largely independently from state control or direction. The ability of nonstate actors to project force across boundaries was readily apparent even before 9/11, but 9/11 seems
to have raised the awareness level to unprecedented heights. It rather focuses one mind when a
terrorist group, Al Qaeda, can organize itself so as launch an attack halfway around the world that
inflicts, in a single day, some 3,000 casualties, destroying the World Trade Center, and severely
damaging the command center of the U.S. military. Attacks associated with Al Qaeda have occurred
annually since 9/11 in various countries from Spain to Indonesia to the United Kingdom.
Does the jus ad bellum speak to such attacks? By its terms, Article 2(4) prohibits uses of
force by one state against another state. Article 51 is less definitive in addressing only inter-state
behavior, but arguably the Charter was designed solely to speak to rights and obligations as between
states, and any act of self-defense must be in response to an armed attack committed by or
attributable to another state. The Nicaragua Court’s viewed attribution of non-state actor conduct
to a state as a salient factor before the jus ad bellum is implicated, and that view was confirmed and
apparently extended by the Court’s 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall.51 In that opinion, the
Court rather summarily dismissed Israel’s claim that it was acting in self-defense against attacks by
terrorist groups. According to the Court, Israel could not possibly be acting in self-defense under
Article 51 because Israel had not claimed that the terrorist attacks at issue were imputable to a
foreign state and because those attacks were not transnational in nature, having occurred wholly
within territory occupied by Israel.52
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The advisory opinion thus appears to extend the Nicaragua paradigm by saying that it is not
possible under any circumstances to engage in an act of self-defense under international law against
a non-state actor; rather, you can only engage in an act of self-defense against another state, and thus
only in situations where the acts of the non-state actor are imputable to that other state. Why that is
the case, however, especially in light of the reaction of the global community (including the Security
Council, NATO, and the OAS) to the attacks by Al Qaeda of 9/11 as justifying a response in selfdefense, the Court failed to explain, notwithstanding the admonitions of some of the judges in their
separate opinions.53 Criticisms of the Court’s position may have prompted the Court to backtrack
in its 2005 case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, where the Court more
tentatively noted that, given the circumstances of the case, there was “no need to respond to the
contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law
provides for a right of self-defense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.”54
The ability of non-state actors to project such force transnationally is coupled with the fear
that the next time it will not be airplanes but a weapon of mass destruction. Considerable attention
is paid to the possibility of a nuclear attack, yet there is also concern that chemical weapons will be
used whose toxic properties produce physical or physiological effects—chlorine, phosgene, mustard
gas, or nerve gases (such as sarin) come to mind. Similarly, there are fears that a terrorist group
might concoct a biological weapon capable of disseminating infectious diseases or conditions that
otherwise do not exist or only exist naturally, by using bacteria (e.g., anthrax), viruses (e.g.,
smallpox), or toxins (e.g., ricin). There are, of course, considerable hurdles for non-state actors in
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obtaining and delivering such weapons, but they are not insurmountable hurdles, and highlyrespected analysts believe the odds to be fairly high that such an attack will eventually occur.
Large-scale terrorist attacks through weapons of mass destruction are not the only “new
threat.” Mavens of our “information age” observe that new methods of cyber-warfare are becoming
a reality, by which states and non-state actors with a comparative disadvantage in hardware may seek
to level the playing field through attacks on software. Even non-traditional dangers such as the
transboundary movement of infectious diseases, living modified organisms, invasive plant species,
or persistent organic chemicals may emerge as grave threats to which states seek to respond forcibly.
IV.

REAFFIRMING OR RECODIFYING THE JUS AD BELLUM
A.

Maintaining the Status Quo

Defenders of the static view of the jus ad bellum view the classic 1945 paradigm as
normatively the best way of organizing inter-state behavior.55 States are permitted to defend
themselves when exposed to an armed attack and states are permitted to use force when authorized
by the Security Council. In all other circumstances, uses of military force are prohibited, even if to
intended to prevent human rights atrocities, because any further exceptions threaten to swallow the
basic rules. Some defenders may maintain that the rule is sacrosanct, but concede (either publicly
or in private conversation) that deviations in extreme situations are legitimate even if not technically
lawful.
Critics of the static view assert that there are situations where uses of force should be allowed
to promote world order, so they typically seek to read the original Charter text as allowing for
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exceptions.56 On this approach, the Article 2(4)/51 construct sets forth imprecise standards that must
be refined through state practice, so clever interpretations of what it means to use force “against
territorial integrity” in Article 2(4) or what Article 51 means when it refers to an “inherent right” of
self-defense allow these critics to embrace contemporary uses of force that are seen as desirable.
Such interpretations are creative, but not particularly persuasive, and certainly have not garnered
widespread support. Other critics adopt a more protean view, stating that the enormous changes in
inter-state relations since 1945 merit rethinking the jus ad bellum.57 Many international relations
theorists and some international lawyers see the jus ad bellum as simply no longer reflecting
contemporary law at all, if it ever did. For them, the jus ad bellum is essentially window dressing,
trotted out by the major powers when it serves their interests to do so, but shoved aside without much
ado when its proscriptions are inconvenient.58
Can this state of affairs, in the long term, endure? Will the current situation remain one
hundred years hence? Given the uncertainty that has existed since 1945, it might plausibly be argued
that maintaining the status quo is feasible and even desirable. The relatively conservative approach
in static jus ad bellum helps discourage pernicious uses of force by limiting exceptions to the Article
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2(4) prohibition. While some further deviations might be desirable, and while lawyers may like to
have clear and transparent rules that are routinely and uniformly followed, perhaps law in this area
should be somewhat vague, generally coercing states into pacific behavior but providing enough
“play-in-the-joints” to accommodate major power politics in a world that cannot be neatly packaged.
To navigate those uncertainties, a Security Council exists to help interpret when a state ranges too
far outside the gray lines, thereby tacitly allowing some uses of force (e.g., Israel’s preemptive selfdefense in the 1967 War) while rejecting others (e.g., Israel’s attack on the Osirak nuclear facility).
Similarly, the Security Council is available to authorize uses of force that are necessary to address
extraordinary circumstances that do not fit static jus ad bellum, such as to stop a government from
inflicting genocide or crimes against humanity upon its own people. On this account, the main
purposes of the Article 2(4)/Article 51 paradigm have been met by essentially eliminating the
recourse to war for territorial expansion, and largely reducing other types of coercion by forcing
states to justify their actions as self-defense against an armed attack, and to risk the approbation
when the justification is weak. The system may not be perfect, but states are generally comfortable
with it, and it is relatively stable.
On the other hand, a fairly plausible case can be made that there is already far too much
confusion and uncertainty in how the jus ad bellum, as crafted in 1945, should be applied in
addressing the wide range of contemporary threats, and that matters may well get worse over the next
century. While transboundary uses of force may not be a daily occurrence, they are not infrequent,
and their adverse affects can be quite grave. The casualness with which Turkey may move armed
forces across the border into Iraq to attack PKK bases (discussed below), without any notable
condemnation by the international community of the action as unlawful, is striking. Any normative
system has gaps and uncertainties, but the list of challenges to the jus ad bellum—on rescue of
nationals, humanitarian intervention, indirect aggression, responses to coercion not considered an
“armed attack,” responses to coercion by non-state actors, anticipatory self-defense, preemptive selfdefense—is rather long.
The Security Council does condemn and occasionally act against some of the most egregious
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violations of the jus ad bellum, but the system is not, and should not, be designed to regard as
permissible all uses of force that are not condemned by the Security Council; indeed, even when
blatant aggression occurs, the Security Council does not always act, such as when Iraq invaded Iran
in 1980 or Eritrea invaded Ethiopia in 1998. Moreover, as is well known, even after the Cold War,
the Security Council is inhibited from either condemning or authorizing uses of force when any one
of the five permanent members politically opposes such action, as occurred with respect to Kosovo
in 1999. While there are areas of common interests among the Security Council members, those
interests are often not in alignment, as can be seen in recent discussions over how to address Iran’s
nascent nuclear program (resistance from Russia) or the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan
(resistance from China). And, like any institution, the Security Council makes mistakes.59
To illuminate the problem with the status quo, one might consider the range of conflicting
practice over just the past two years with regard to whether a state may respond to a terrorist attack
by undertaking a cross-border raid against a terrorist camp without the consent of the host state:
•

In the summer of 2006, the Hezbollah movement, operating out of Lebanon, crossed
into Israel’s northern border, attacked and killed several Israeli soldiers, seizing two
as hostages, before returning to Lebanon. Israel responded by sending military forces
into, and by bombing portions of, southern Lebanon in an effort to secure the release
of the soldiers and to diminish Hezbollah’s military capabilities. During the course
of the hostilities, Hezbollah fired some 4,000 rockets across the border into Israel,
which Human Rights Watch determined intentionally targeted the civilian
population.60 Rather than condemn Israel’s action, the Security Council expressed
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“its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel
since Hezbollah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006" and welcomed Lebanon’s efforts
“to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces,
such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon
and no authority other than that of the government of Lebanon.”61
•

In January 2007, the Palestinian militant organization and political party Hamas was
elected as the government of the Palestinian Authority. In June of that year, Hamas
seized control of the Gaza strip from Fatah-controlled Palestinian security forces.
Since 2002, Hamas has used homemade (relatively crude) Qassam rockets launched
from the Gaza Strip to hit Israeli towns in the Negev. More recently, Iranian-made
rockets have allowed Hamas to reach large Israeli cities, such as Ashkelon
(population of 120,000). That increased capability prompted Israel in early 2008 to
launch a major military ground operation as well as air strikes against Hamas fighters
in the Gaza Strip.62 To date, no resolutions have been adopted by the Security
Council or General Assembly on the matter.

•

In October 2007, the Turkish government received a one-year authorization from its
parliament to conduct military operations in northern Iraq against the Kurdish
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separatist guerilla organization known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (or PKK).63
Since its founding in the 1970's, the PKK has sponsored numerous attacks against
Turkish forces as a part of its campaign to establish an independent Kurdistan. By
some estimates, over the past three decades, Turkey has responded with twenty-four
cross-border attacks into Iraq,64 but has failed to route the PKK. The most recent
response involved air strikes against PKK camps and villages,65 as well as an eightday ground offensive.66 Although both the United States and the European Union
expressed concerns about Turkey’s action, to date no resolutions have been adopted
by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the European Union, or NATO
condemning Turkey’s conduct as unlawful.
•

In January 2008, the United States launched a pilotless CIA Predator aircraft from a
base within Pakistani territory which proceeded to fire two Hellfire missiles into a
compound of buildings near the Pakistani town of Mir Ali, reportedly killing a senior
Al Qaeda commander. While the United States previously had requested specific
permission from the Pakistani government for such operations, in this instance such
permission was not sought,67 though it may have been the product of a general U.S.-
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Pakistani arrangement allowing unilateral U.S. action.68
•

In December 2006, Ethiopian military forces ousted from power in Somalia a group
of Sharia Courts known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU had united
themselves to form a rival administration to the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) of Somalia, and had succeeded in controlling most of southern Somalia and
the vast majority of its population. Since ouster of the ICU from power, the United
States has launched from its naval vessels at least four missile strikes in Somalia
against Islamic leaders accused of being terrorists.69 (For example, one of the strikes
targetted a Kenyan who is believed to have played a major role in the bombings of
two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998.) The TFG reportedly has allowed the United
States a free hand in undertaking such attacks though, since the TFG faces a
widespread civil war, its ability to authorize external interference is open to question.

•

A classified 2005 U.S. document concerning rules of engagement in Iraq envisaged
the ability of U.S. military forces to cross from Iraq into Iran, Syria or other countries
bordering Iraq, even without those countries’ consent.70 Generally, such action was
only authorized after securing approval from the U.S. Secretary of Defense, which
might entail obtaining Presidential approval. Yet according to the document,
Secretary of Defense approval was not necessary in situations of hot pursuit from Iraq
into Iran or Syria against former members of Saddam Hussein’s government and
terrorists, or “when Syria or Iran cannot or will not prevent a hostile force from using

68

See Eric Schmitt & David Sanger, Pakistan Shift Could Curtail Drone Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008, at A1; Robin Wright & Joby Warrick, U.S. Steps Up Unilateral Strikes in
Pakistan, WASH . POST , Mar. 27, 2008, at A1.
69

See Stephanie McCrummen, U.S. Strike in Somalia Targets Terror Suspects, WASH .
POST , Mar. 4, 2008, at A13.
70

U.S. Rules of Engagement for Iraq, available at
http://www.wikileaks.org/wiki/US_Rules_of_Engagement_for_Iraq.

27
their airspace, land territory, internal waters or territorial seas to attack US and/or
designated forces and the hostile force constitutes an imminent threat to ongoing
operations.71
•

On March 1, 2008, Colombian military forces bombed and crossed into Ecuador to
attack guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who
maintain camps along the border. Colombia regards the FARC as a terrorist and
drug-trafficking organization, while some in the region see them as revolutionaries
fighting a U.S.-backed puppet government. Ecuador and Venezuela responded to the
raid by sending troops to their borders with Colombia, while Nicaragua broke off
diplomatic relations with Colombia.72 In this instance, neither the Security Council
nor the General Assembly condemned that action. The Organization of American
States, however, adopted a resolution declaring the Colombian raid to be a violation
of Ecuador’s sovereignty, though stopping short of expressly condemning
Colombia.73
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These examples indicate that many states are concerned about the legality of the cross-border
uses of force against terrorist camps, but that condemnation on the basis of a legal violation is erratic,
perhaps suggesting that a much more nuanced legal standard may be operating than is captured by
the static jus ad bellum paradigm. On issues such as this, as time progresses, the static jus ad bellum
position may become increasingly questioned and viewed as untenable or unconvincing.
Hence, the argument against the status quo is that civilized societies can and should do better,
at least if they aspire to the maintenance of international peace and security through predicable and
transparent processes. As Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated in his 2005 report In Larger
Freedom,
an essential part of the consensus we must seek must be agreement on when and how force
can be used to defend international peace and security. In recent years, this issue has deeply
divided Member States. They have disagreed about whether States have the right to use
military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; whether they
have the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminent
threats; and whether they have the right—or perhaps the obligation—to use it protectively
to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable crimes. . . . Agreement
must be reached on these questions if the United Nations is to be—as it was intended to
be—a forum for resolving differences rather than a mere stage for acting them out.74
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In the face of such uncertainty, consideration should be given to a formal reaffirmation of the
static jus ad bellum position if that position truly reflects contemporary global expectations. By
“reaffirmation” of the static jus ad bellum, I do not mean a statement of the kind that was issued at
the 2005 World Summit. At that meeting, some 150 world leaders adopted a declaration that, among
other things, reiterated “the obligation of all Member States to refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,”75
and reaffirmed “that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of
threats to international peace and security.”76 Such a “reaffirmation” fails to grapple directly with
differing interpretations of what the Charter actually requires—it simply papers over those
differences. Instead, a true reaffirmation would specifically address how the jus ad bellum relates
to contemporary threats.
Alternatively, if contemporary global expectations diverge from the static position, then a
recodification of the jus ad bellum may in order. By recodification, I mean a restatement of the
rudimentary rules of the jus ad bellum in light of the wide range of threats that have already occurred
and will continue to occur in the years to come. In essence, it would be an effort to engage in the
same conversation today that occurred when the major powers at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 drafted
what became Article 2(4) and when the San Francisco conference adopted Article 51 in 1945.
Trying to reaching a consensus either on a reaffirmation of the static jus ad bellum position
or on a recodification of the changed jus ad bellum may well be politically infeasible, given the
significance of the issue, the rhetorical posturing that governments engage in, the considerable divide
between more powerful and less powerful states, and the potential for any process to be sidetracked
by current events. Recent efforts by even non-governmental entities, such as the ICISS and the 2005
U.N. high-level panel , have revealed the difficulties and controversy that any such effort will entail.
Indeed, a credible argument might be made that the only point at which the jus ad bellum will be ripe
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for either reaffirmation or recodification is when it completely breaks down, ushering in a new era
for rebuilding or strengthening international institutions. The ICISS’s Responsibility to Protect report
candidly noted that “it would be impossible to find consensus, in the Commission's view, around any
set of proposals for military intervention which acknowledged the validity of any intervention not
authorized by the Security Council or General Assembly.”77
Indeed, perhaps the strongest argument for adhering to the status quo is not that the static jus
ad bellum is a stable and intrinsically optimal regime, but that efforts to move to a more protean
conception will be even more destabilizing, forcing states and non-state actors to confront a
normative system over which they have fundamental disagreements. Deep schisms between powerful
states and less-powerful states, and even among close allies, may well be revealed and become more
entrenched. The considerable difficulties that the NATO states encountered in identifying a legal
theory justifying their actions to protect Kosovo provide a window on the problems that would be
faced in either reaffirming or recodifying the jus ad bellum. Imagine the difficulty in securing
agreement between the United States and the developing world about preemptive self-defense, or
between France and China over humanitarian intervention, and the problem becomes manifest. As
such, better to let sleeping dogs lie.
Nevertheless, given that efforts like ICISS or the High Level Panel are already occurring,
we may be entering a period where a reaffirmation or recodification of the jus ad bellum is viewed
as politically feasible and desirable. While strong adherence to the core paradigm remains, powerful
sentiments are emerging in favor of a more sophisticated normative system, driven by the rise of
human rights, the threat of terrorism, and the fear of weapons of mass destruction. As these
sentiments become more insistent, initiatives such as ICISS and the 2005 U.N. high-level panel may
prove to be just the first wave in efforts to revisit and reevaluate the jus ad bellum. Developing
countries, faced with issues such as threats of non-proliferation, are acting in a manner that might
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not have been predicted even a few years ago.78
Notably, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute contemplates that the Court will
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once the states parties adopt a provision at their
review conference (scheduled for 2010) setting forth a definition of aggression and the conditions
under which the Court could exercise its jurisdiction over it.79 At present, a special working group
has been established by the ICC Assembly of State Parties toward that end, and may result in a
formulation of aggression that reaffirms or recodifies the static jus ad bellum. Even if the ICC’s work
essentially cross-references to the UN Charter, leaving current uncertainties intact, placing
aggression within the scope of the ICC’s mandate may well galvanize states into a reaffirmation or
recodification process, as a means of clarifying when government leaders may be exposed to charges
of criminal conduct. Some states may resist reaching a consensus, but non-state actors may be
powerful agitators for a consensus position to emerge. And while it often seems that certain hurdles
in interstate relations are insurmountable, there are plenty of examples, even in recent years, of those
hurdles being swept aside by powerful currents of history (the reunification of Germany, the demise
of South African apartheid, or the establishment of an international criminal court come to mind).
Defenders of static jus ad bellum might be correct that, notwithstanding all the new inter-state
influences since 1945, the prevailing view today is still in favor of a strictly interpreted jus ad
bellum; but if that is true, perhaps the time has come to formally reaffirm it. If it is not true, then
perhaps the time has come to recodify the jus ad bellum so as to ensure its continuing relevance for
inter-state relations and to provide it with a stronger pedigree than currently exists.
B.

Debating Reaffirmation or Recodification
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If maintaining the status quo is unstable, what directions should a contemporary debate over
the jus ad bellum take? A starting point might be to approach the jus ad bellum more holistically than
is usually the case. The standard approach in international legal analysis is to slice the jus ad bellum
up into segments, in which consideration is given to issues such as rescue of nationals, humanitarian
intervention, anticipatory self-defense, and so on. Within each segment, state practice is tallied up
as showing either “legality” or “illegality” so as to reach a conclusion about the permissibility of
using force in that particular context. Yet doing so is unsatisfactory, given that state practice tends
to be spare, conflicting, and susceptible to alternative interpretations.
If instead, one were to step back from these segments so as to ask broader questions about
when it is that the global community (however that might be defined) generally seems to favor uses
of force, then the picture might become clearer. Certain general parameters would seem to be
relatively accurate in helping to predict whether coercive behavior is acceptable, no matter the
context in which it is deployed. Those parameters might concern: (1) the degree of coercion actually
inflicted by State A upon State B or its nationals; (2) the gravity of coercion that State A fears from
State B; (3) the extent to which other States are condoning State A’s coercion; (4) the pedigree of
State B as a member of the international community; (5) the degree to which State A’s coercion is
tailored to respond to the threat from State B; or (6) the degree to which State A’s coercion has
adverse collateral consequences for other states or persons.
Under such a holistic approach, one would not read the global response to the attacks of 9/11
as solely relevant to the issue of permissible uses of force against a non-state actor, although it is
certainly relevant to that issue. Rather, one would apply the precedent more broadly as relevant to
our understanding of how the jus ad bellum operates in various circumstances. In other words, the
9/11 precedent can shed light on: (1) what constitutes an armed attack?; (2) how immediate must a
likely further attack be before a state can respond in self-defense?; (3) what level of collective
support or endorsement is possible when embarking on an act of self-defense?; (4) what kinds of
delinquent acts might be held against a state from its past when considering its ability to invoke
standard rights of sovereignty today under international law?; and (5) how does the gravity of the
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attack effect the scope of necessity and proportionality accorded to the defending state?
A second beneficial direction might entail analyzing relevant norms or instruments that are
not, strictly speaking, a part of the jus ad bellum, but that offer a window on contemporary
community expectations. For example, in thinking through whether a state can engage in self-defense
against a non-state actor who is believed to be acquiring weapons of mass destruction, it seems
relevant to note that the Security Council in 2004 decided that all states must prohibit non-state
actors in their territory from manufacturing or acquiring such weapons.80 Assuming that the
resolution is within the power of the Security Council (some have claimed it to be ultra vires), then
it seems highly relevant to the issue of the relationship of a state to non-state actors in its territory,
and may serve to bridge whatever links of attribution are necessary to allow self-defense against that
non-state actor.
Similarly, one might consider how evolutions in the jus in bello over time might be affecting
the jus ad bellum. The 2006 U.S. Supreme Court case Hamdan v. Rumsfeld81 reached the conclusion
that when common Article 3 refers to an armed conflict that is not international in nature, that
includes the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda. One can argue about whether that was
the right conclusion: (1) on the one hand, according certain minimal protections to the Guantanomo
detainees using common Article 3 and Protocol I Article 75 seems like a good thing; (2) on the other
hand, Common Article 3 was probably intended only to address internal armed conflict, not
transnational armed conflict involving a state and a non-state actor. The point, however, is that if the
Hamdan court is right—or even if we set aside the Hamdan decision and simply consider the
protections that exist in common Article 3 and Protocol II for non-state actors—one arrives at a place
where the jus in bello is trying to take account of and regulate activities relating to non-state actors.
Should not the jus ad bellum do so as well?
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In an essay of this length, a standard ploy might be to plead that there is not enough time to
actually craft a proposed reaffirmation or recodification but, as a starting point, one could imagine
the following as possible starting points:
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Reaffirmation of Static Jus Ad Bellum
1. The use or threat of use of armed force by
one state against another state is prohibited in
all circumstances unless:
a) taken in response to a prior armed attack by
another state until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security; or
b) authorized by the Security Council as a
means of addressing, under Chapter VII of
the Charter, a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression.
2. Measures taken in the exercise of the right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported
to the Security Council.
3. All uses of armed force must be necessary
and proportionate in relation to the threat that
has arisen and must be undertaken in
accordance with applicable international
humanitarian law.

Recodification of Protean Jus Ad Bellum
1. The use or threat of use of armed force by one state
against another state is prohibited unless undertaken
in accordance with paragraphs (2)-(6).
2. The Security Council may authorize the use of
armed force by a state as a means of addressing,
under Chapter VII of the Charter, a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.
3. A state may use or threaten to use armed force
against another state in response to an actual or
imminent armed attack by that other state, including
an attack in the form of the seizure of nationals, until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security.
4. A state may use or threaten to use armed force
against another state in response to an actual or
imminent widespread deprivation of fundamental
human rights, after notification to and debate of the
matter at the Security Council, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. To the extent
possible, such action shall be taken through regional
or sub-regional organizations.
5. States may use or threaten to use armed force
against a non-state actor located in another state in the
circumstances set forth in (3), but only if the other
state has been provided a reasonable opportunity to
address the matter directly, and has either refused to
do so or is incapable of doing so.
6. Measures taken under (3), (4), or (5) shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council.
7. All uses of armed force must be necessary and
proportionate in relation to the threat that has arisen and
must be undertaken in accordance with applicable
international humanitarian law.
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Obviously, certain normative choices have been made in the proposed reaffirmation and
proposed recodification, placing them at somewhat opposite ends of a potential spectrum of options.
Further, the proposals above largely remain captured by the subject matter divisions in possible uses
of force, rather than utilizing some of the more abstract (and perhaps controversial) factors suggested
previously in this section. Nevertheless, these proposals may serve as a starting point for acheiving
a consensus on the contemporary preferences of states or non-state actors regarding the jus ad
bellum.
C.

The Means of a Reaffirmation or Recodification

The political feasibility of reaffirming or recodifying the jus ad bellum would turn on
addressing not just the substance of the law but the means for establishing that substance. The most
formal means of change, amendment of the Charter, is the least likely path to success, while the least
formal change, through statements of non-governmental actors, may attract insufficient state
adherence to be effective. Various possibilities exist that will no doubt be explored, to one degree
or another, in the years to come.
Through Amendment of Charter. Though the Charter can be amended, the process for doing
so is cumbersome, requiring a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and then
ratification by two thirds of the UN members, including all the permanent members of the Security
Council.82 Successful amendments have only occurred five times, all on issues relating to the
increase in the size of the UN membership, not as a means of altering the substantive rights and
obligations set forth in the Charter. Hence, the procedural hurdles of this process are quite significant
and, absent tectonic shifts in geopolitics, likely insurmountable.
Through UNGA Resolution. Technically, the General Assembly has no express power to
issue a resolution binding upon all states as to the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51. Nevertheless,
the travaux preparatoires of the Charter, and the jurisprudence of the International Court, have
recognized the competence of organs of the United Nations, in the first instance, to interpret
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provisions of the Charter relevant to their work. Though the Security Council is the principal UN
organ for addressing peace and security, it is not the exclusive authority, leaving to the General
Assembly an important and relevant role.83 Further, since the General Assembly has within it
representation of all states, resolutions that it adopts by consensus or by overwhelming majority that
purport to recognize existing norms of international law can be highly authoritative evidence that
such law exists. With respect to the jus ad bellum, the General Assembly has previously played a role
through its adoption of various resolutions, including its resolutions on friendly relations84 and, as
previously noted, on aggression, and remains available to do so today, as evidenced by the 2005
World Summit Outcome document.
The problem with this venue is that the General Assembly has not proven to be a particularly
effective body for engaging in sophisticated brokering of views between states over contentious
issues. The political dynamics within the Assembly tends to drive toward an outcome that either only
reflects the largest bloc of non-aligned states or that represents a consensus view concerning text that
has little meaning. Whether a global parliament85 based on popular representation, rather than on
representation of states, would avoid such pitfalls is unclear, but if one were to emerge it, too, could
be a potential venue.
Through UNSC Resolution. This option may represent the most intriguing possibility, given
the increased activity of the Security Council in the post-Cold War era, the power of the Security
Council to issue decisions that bind all UN members, and the Council’s willingness to engage in
“legislative-type” resolutions on fundamental security issues, such as controls on terrorist financing
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.86 At present there seems to be little P-5 agreement
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on a recodification of the jus ad bellum, but there are emerging areas of common interest (e.g., the
ability to strike at terrorist havens) and it not beyond imagination that at some point a political
alignment would occur to issue a resolution that “clarifies” the meaning of the jus ad bellum.
Through Major Power Agreement. If reaching agreement within the major political
institutions is difficult, another path would be for the major powers to reach agreement on instances
when they favor or at least will not oppose uses of military force, as well as those circumstances
where they will oppose the use of force. The composition of this group might include the P-5 and
other states, or might be more oriented toward North American and West European states. Any
product from such a group by itself would be non-binding, but it would help illuminate the beliefs
of those states who are most likely to deploy military force. Other states could react to whatever
declaration emerges from this process, providing a basis for identifying areas of agreement and
disagreement.
Through Case Law. At least within international legal circles, there is an acceptance that the
decisions of the International Court of Justice and other competent international courts carry
considerable weight in identifying international law, including changes that have occurred in the law.
To the extent that the jus ad bellum requires reaffirmation or recodification, which cannot be secured
through political organs of the United Nations, then perhaps international courts are the place to
look. Arguably reaffirmation is exactly what the International Court has done in its jurisprudence;
its decision in the Oil Platforms case87 might best be understood as confirming the static jus ad
bellum and eschewing any explicit, significant new contribution to the notion of self-defence.88
One problem with reliance on case law, however, is that the cases are extremely sparse and
often present anomalous factual scenarios that are not easily or convincingly extrapolated to broader
statements about the meaning of the jus ad bellum. Indeed, given the importance of the subject, it
87
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is rather remarkable that the International Court went for fifty years having only squarely addressed
the jus ad bellum in one case (the Nicaragua case). In the post-Cold War era, there has been a
somewhat greater willingness for cases to be brought to the Court and for the Court to address, on
the merits, matters related to the jus ad bellum. Yet even so, cases such as the 1996 Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons,89 the 1998 Spain/Canada Fisheries Jurisdiction case
90

(which provided the Court an opportunity to opine on what sort of coercion does not squarely fall

within Article 2(4) of the Charter), the 2003 Iranian Oil Platforms judgment, 2004 Advisory Opinion
on the Israeli Wall,91 and the 2005 Congo/Uganda Armed Activities case,92 have left many questions
unanswered about the contours of the jus ad bellum. Perhaps to fill the gap, other tribunals are
joining in as well. In December 2005, the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission found that Eritrea
violated UN Charter Article 2(4) by invading and occupying parts of Ethiopia or Ethiopianadministered territory in May 1998.93 In September 2007, an arbitral panel convened under the Law
of the Sea Convention found a violation of Article 2(4), this time in the form of a threat to use force
by a Surinamese patrol boat against an oil rig.94 Yet these tribunals too have been fairly cautious and
sometimes cursory in their treatment of the law.
Broadly speaking, courts and tribunals have done little to advance understandings about
whether and how to adapt the jus ad bellum to contemporary threats or crises, with the most notable
example perhaps being the International Court’s cursory treatment of the issue of attacks by non-state
actors in the Israeli Wall advisory opinion. While a general advisory opinion might be sought from

89

Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8).
90

Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4).

91

See supra note 51.

92

See supra note 54.

93

Partial Award on the Jus ad Bellum, Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8, dispositif at para. B(1)
(Erit.-Eth. Cl. Comm. Dec. 19, 2005), reprinted in 45 I.L.M. 430 (2006).
94

Award of the Arbitral Tribunal (Guyana v. Suriname), para. 445 (Sept. 17, 2007). The
oil rig had been authorized by Guyana to engage in exploratory drilling on a part of the
continental shelf in dispute between the two states.

40
the International Court of Justice on the scope of contemporary jus ad bellum, it seems likely that
the Court would be extremely cautious in issuing such an opinion, uncertain how its views might be
received by states, and reluctant to provide more than the most general of views. Perhaps it is simply
too much to expect international courts to lead the way in this area.
Through “Principles” Adopted by Non-State Actors. Considerable international legal
scholarship in recent years has focused on the rise of the non-state actor as a critical feature of the
ways in which international law is created, interpreted, and even enforced.95 Epistemic communities
operating across boundaries are doing much to galvanize public opinion on key issues of
transnational law, which in turn influences the ways states conduct themselves.
As the work of the ICISS and the 2005 U.N. high-level panel show, there are roles that can
be played by non-governmental organizations or expert groups in attempting to articulate and clarify
the central norms of the jus ad bellum. The work product of such initiatives is not regarded as
binding upon states, and hence may not be effective, but it can be the starting point for a process that
flowers into a formal arrangement, as may been seen in initiatives ranging from the regulation of
land mines to the establishment of the international criminal court.96
VII.

CONCLUSION
While the jus ad bellum has a hardened normative core that is widely accepted by states, there

appears to be considerably less consensus around the margins of the norm, with its application
changing considerably based on the context in which the norm is being applied. In this sense, the jus
ad bellum has a much more protean nature than is commonly recognized by states and non-state
actors. The traditional approach of seeing uses of force as being lawful/unlawful base solely on
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whether they are taken in self-defense against a prior armed attack, or with Security Council
authorization, increasingly seems unconvincing or, at a minimum, a poor predictor of the likely
response of the global community. That does not mean that the jus ad bellum has no part to play on
the margins; it retains an important role in conditioning global conduct and reactions to that conduct,
but that role may increasingly diminish in the years to come.
Three options present themselves. States and non-state actors can continue to operate under
the current system, which tends to view the jus ad bellum as a static law unchanged since 1945.
Strong reasons support this option, including the claim that the current system is reasonably stable
and could be significantly destablized by moving to a different position. Alternatively, if the existing
system is not stable or will become unstable over time, and if that instability is partly due to a belief
in some quarters that times have changed since adoption of the original Charter paradigm, then states
and non-state actors could seek to reaffirm the static jus ad bellum, if that remains the consensus
position. Finally, if the status quo is untenable, and there is no consensus on the static view, then
states and non-state actors might do well to seek consensus on a recodification of the jus ad bellum
to reflect its protean nature.
A formal reaffirmation or recodification in the near-term may be politically infeasible, but
various factors may push the global community in that direction in the years to come. Even short of
developing a new global consensus, for the jus ad bellum to retain a vibrant, authoritative role in
inter-state relations, it likely needs to find ways to accommodate new threats to the global order,
through more refined decisions of international courts, more sophisticated approaches to
international treaties and UN resolutions, and sharper analysis in the academy.

